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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
JURISDICTION: Right to Regulate Environmental Landfill Site
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, No. 96-1581, 118 S. Ct. 789 (U.S. Jan.
26, 1998)
South Dakota claims the right to regulate a landfill constructed on non-
Indian fee land even though that land falls within the boundaries of the
original Yankton Reservation.' Conversely, the Yanktons argue that federal
environmental regulations should be applied to the landfill site because it is
located within Indian country as proscribed by the 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a).
In the early 1800s, the Yankton Sioux Tribe (Yankton) freely roamed its
territory consisting of 13 million acres of land between the Des Moines and
Missouri rivers. When the United States needed more land to offer white
settlers, it entered into a Treaty2 with the Yanktons, taking most of their 13
million acres. The Yanktons were left with 430,405 acres located in the
southeastern part of Charles Mix County, South Dakota In exchange for this
land, the federal government promised the Yanktons protection from white
people, and agreed to pay the Yanktons a sum of money, provide livestock
and agricultural equipment, and to construct houses and schools.4 However,
with passage of the Dawes Act in 1887, 5 members of the Tribe were allotted
individual tracts. The government then negotiated for the cession of over
168,000 acres which were opened to white settlement over the strong protests
of the Yanktons.6
An agreement ratified by the Congress in 1894 paid the Yanktons $600,000
to cede, relinquish, and sell to the United States all of its unallotted lands.!
Article XVII of this agreement, known as a saving clause, explained that
nothing in the 1894 agreement would abrogate the 1858 Treaty, and all
provisions of the Treaty would be in full force and effect.8 The State argues
that it has jurisdiction over the unallotted lands because the Act of 1894
1. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 118 S. Ct. 789, 793 (U.S. Jan. 28, 1998).
2. Treaty of Apr. 19, 1858, United States-Yankton Sioux, 11 Stat. 743.
3. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 118 S. Ct. at 794.
4. Id.
5. General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 331 (1994)).
6. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 118 S. Ct. at 796.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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diminished the reservation freeing said unallotted lands from federal
overview.9
The Yanktons claim that because the proposed landfill is located within the
boundaries of the Yankton Reservation as set out in the 1858 Treaty, federal
environmental regulations should be applied."0 The location of the landfill
project corresponds to the land allotted to individual Indians on the Yankton
Sioux Reservation. Although the land was deeded to a non-Indian as a
homestead under the Homestead Act of 1904, the land retained its restrictions
and was inalienable under the Dawes Act for a twenty-five-year period.
In a suit brought by the Yankton Sioux Tribe, the district court held that
the Tribe itself could not assert regulatory authority over non-Indian activity
on fee lands." Additionally, the activity (regulating a landfill) did not affect
"the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
Tribe." Consequently, the Yankton Tribe was precluded from invoking its
inherent sovereignty under the exceptions of Montana v. United States.3
However, the district court did find that the landfill site was within the
boundaries of the Reservation according to the 1858 Treaty, and therefore
subject to federal environmental regulations. 4
The ]Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in a divided decision held that, while
Congress intended for the Yanktons to sell their surplus lands to the
government under the 1894 Act, it did not intend for the Yanktons to
relinquish authority over their lands."5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to determine whether unallotted, ceded lands were severed from the
Reservation, thereby relinquishing the Tribe's authority over those lands.
The Court found that the Act of 1894 was a negotiated agreement
providing for complete surrender of the unallotted lands in exchange for
compensation. 6 Relying on its decision in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip,7 the
Court states that when Congress compensates an Indian Tribe for the cession
of its lands, or any part thereof, an "almost insurmountable presumption of
diminishment arises."'" Additionally, the savings clause contained in the 1894
Act cannot be interpreted too literally because to do so would be to "impugn
the entire sale."'9 Instead the Court explains that a sensible construction must
be given to the savings clause. The payments and annuities owed by the
9. M. at 791.
10. Id. at 796.
11. Id. at 797.
12. Id. (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 798.
17. 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
18. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 118 S. Ct. at 798.
19. Id. at 799.
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government to the Yanktons under the 1858 Treaty should continue to be
paid.' However, all other portions of the 1858 Treaty, especially those clauses
favorable to the Yanktons, can be ignored because the "precise cession and
sum certain language contained in the 1894 Act plainly indicates
diminishment, and a reasonable interpretation of the saving clause does not
conflict with a like conclusion in this case."' 2
In a result oriented decision, the Court held that Congress diminished the
Yankton Sioux Reservation by application of the 1894 Act.2 Thus, the State
has jurisdiction over all unallotted lands because these lands no longer
constitute Indian country.' Based on this decision, the State can apply its
environmental regulations to the landfill site.'
JURISDICTION: Sovereign Immunity
Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., No. 96-1037, 1998 WL
260001 (U.S. May 26, 1998)
In Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., the Kiowa Industrial
Development Commission entered into an agreement with Manufacturing
Technologies to buy stock. The Tribe executed a promissory note. The note
was signed off of tribal lands in Oklahoma City. The Tribe then reneged on
its commitment to pay the note. Suit was brought in Oklahoma state court.
The trial court denied the Tribe's motion for dismissal on grounds of
sovereign immunity. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
and the Oklahoma Supreme Court declined to review the decision.'
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision,' stating that
sovereign immunity applies regardless of where the business is conducted.
"As a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where
Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity. To
date, our cases have sustained tribal immunity from suit without drawing a
distinction based on where the tribal activities occurred."' The Court further
stated, "As a matter of law tribal immunity is a matter of federal law and is
not subject to diminution by the States."'
In this decision, the Court upheld and clarified the concept of tribal
sovereign immunity. However, the Court all but requested action by Congress
to repeal sovereign immunity. The Court noted instances where those ignorant
20. Id.
21. Id. at 800.
22. Id. at 805.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc., 1998 WL 260001, at *2.
26. Id.
27. Id. (citations omitted).
28. Id. at *3.
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of sovereign immunity or those who have no choice, such as in tort cases, 2
would be victimized by immunity. The majority opinion stated, "These
considerations might suggest a need to abrogate tribal immunity, at least as
an overarching rule."" The Court did not change the old rule nor did it
institute a new one. Instead, the Court deferred this to Congress.3'
Most tribes will welcome the decision of the Court to uphold tribal
sovereign immunity. However, with power comes the responsibility not to
abuse it. Cases such as this one can only help opponents of tribal sovereign
immunity in their quest to destroy or severely limit it. When tribal sovereign
immunity is used to shield a tribe against unethical actions by the tribe, that
tribe opens the door to attack against all the others. The dissenting opinion
of Justice Stevens sums it up when he refers to the rule as "unjust ... [to
those] who have no opportunity to negotiate for a waiver of sovereign
immunity .... Governments, like individuals, should pay their debts and
should be held accountable for their unlawful, injurious conduct."3
POWER TO TAX: Tribal Government Taxation Power in Its Territory
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, No. 96-1577, 1998
WL 75038 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1998)
In 1943, a reservation was created for the Neets'aii Gwich'in Indians from
lands surrounding the village of Venetie and another tribal village.3 This land
remained a reservation under the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior
for approximately eighteen years until Congress passed the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA).' With passage of ANCSA, Congress
sought to remove all claims, restrictions and supervision from reservations.
As consideration for extinguishment of claims, restrictions and supervision,
Congress transferred $962.5 million and 44 million acres to state-chartered
private business corporations as tenants in common, whose shareholders
comprised only of Alaska Natives." Subsequently, two native corporations
transferred title in fee simple lands to the Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Government (the Tribe).'
In 1986, Alaska entered into a joint venture with a private contractor to
build a public school within the Village of Venetie. The Tribe assessed taxes
29. d. at *5.
30. Id.
31. Id. at *6.
32. Id at *10.
33. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, No. 96-1577, 1998 WL 75038, at *1
(U.S. Feb. 25, 1998).
34. Id. at *3 (citing Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, ch. 33, 85 Stat. 688 (1971)
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628) (1994)).
35. Id.
36. Id.
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in the amount of $161,000 against the contractor for conducting business on
tribal lands.37 In an attempt to collect the tax, the Tribe pursued its claim in
tribal court. The State sought an injunction in federal district court against the
Tribe's collection of the taxes. 8 The district court held that the Tribe's land
failed to meet the definition of Indian country as set out in 18 U.S.C. §
1151(b).39 Therefore, the Tribe lacked the power to tax any non-tribal
members. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed holding that ANCSA
did not eliminate Indian country in Alaska and that it may still exist.4 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals
correctly determined that the Tribe's land is Indian country.4 '
The Court relied on a statutory interpretation of Indian country in
conjunction with its decisions set out in United States v. Sandoval,42 United
States v. Pelican,43 and United States v. McGowan.' The Court explained that
to meet the requirements of Indian country two general factors must be met.
First, the lands must be set aside for the use of Indians, and, second, the
Native inhabitants must be under federal superintendence.45 The federal set-
aside requirement guarantees that the land in question is occupied by an
Indian community, while the supervision requirement confirms that the
community is sufficiently dependent on the federal government.
The Court explained that the Tribe's ANCSA lands met neither of the
restrictions. ANCSA revoked all existing Alaska reservations set aside by
governmental order for use by Indians or Natives, thus failing to meet the
federal set-aside restriction.47 Additionally, the lands failed to meet any set-
aside restrictions because the lands were transferred to private corporations
with no restraints on alienation or use restrictions attached.48 The Court
further explains that because any protections the federal government may
currently extend to Alaska Natives does not approach the level of active
federal control and stewardship over Indian lands in other parts of the country,
the federal superintendence requirement is not met.49 The Court points out that
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at *3, 4.
41. Id. at *4.
42. 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913), cited in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 1998
WL 75038, at *5.
43. 232 U.S. 442, 449 (1914), cited in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't,
1998 WL 75038, at *6.
44. 302 U.S. 535, 538 (1938), cited in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't,
1998 WL 75038, at *6.
45. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 1998 WL 75038, at *7.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at *8.
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the primary purpose of ANCSA is to promote Native self-determination -
a goal shared by the Tribe.' The Court reversed the judgment of the court
of appeals, and left the modification of Indian country as a question for
Congress."
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
GAMING: An Interpretation of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe, No. 97-1546, 1998 WL 30158 (8th Cir.
Jan. 29, 1998)
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)' allows an Indian Tribe to
conduct gaming activities on Indian country provided that the State, in which
the Tribe is located, permits gaming. 3 The Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska
(the Tribe) negotiated with the State of Nebraska (the State) for a gaming
compact to allow the Tribe to operate class III gaming on the Tribe's lands.'
The Tribe elected to open a gaming facility even though negotiations with the
State failed. The gaming facility, opened to tribal members and the general
public, offered video slot machines, video poker machines and video blackjack
machines."
The Tribe filed suit in district court against the State for failure to negotiate
in good faith.' However, the district court, relying on the United States
Supreme Court decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida ' dismissed the Tribe's
suit and denied its motion for a new trial. Subsequently, the Chairman of the
National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) notified the Tribe that it had
violated the IGRA and ordered a temporary closure of the Tribe's facility."
The Tribe closed its facility, and appealed the Chairman's order; however, it
reopened its gaming facility a short time later. The United States then filed
a complaint against the Tribe for conducting a class III gaming facility in
violation of federal and state law.59
In a multitude of filed and dismissed charges between the Tribe, the NIGC
and the United States, the district court ultimately determined that a civil
50. id.
51. Id.
52. Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-
2721 (1994); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168 (1994)), cited in United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe, No.
97-1546, 1998 WL 30158, at *1 (8th Cir. Jan. 29, 1998).
53. United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe, 1998 WL 30158, at *1.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
58. United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe, 1998 WL 30158, at *1.
59. Id. at *2.
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injunction could not be utilized to prevent the Tribe from engaging in illegal
activities.' Additionally, because the Tribe's activities had not been
determined to be a nuisance under state law, the court did not have the
authority to enjoin the Tribe's activities. Further, the district court interpreted
the IGRA as restricting the United States Attorney General to criminal
prosecution only, and disallowing any civil injunctive relief The United
States appealed the district court's refusal to (1) enjoin the Tribe's activity and
(2) enforce the NIGC's closure order against the Tribe.'
The court of appeals determined that even though the IGRA is silent on the
right to enforce the NIGC's closure orders, it could assume that Congress
intended for the Attorney General to conduct enforcement procedures on
behalf of the NIGC.' The court based its findings on 28 U.S.C. § 516 which
gives the Attorney General exclusive authority and plenary power over
litigation involving the United States.6' Additionally, the court relied on a
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Republic Steel Corp.' which set
forth a test to decide "whether the United States has an interest to protect or
defend."'M
The court pointed out certain undisputed facts, such as the use of class EE[
gaming devices by the Tribe, and the lack of a tribal-state gaming compact.67
Subsequently, the court determined that the Tribe acted in violation of the
IGRA because its gaming activities conflicted with Nebraska laws. IGRA
incorporates by reference all State laws pertaining to gambling or its
prohibition.' Thus, the court held that IGRA incorporates both statutory and
case law of the State of Nebraska, and because Nebraska law'M allows for
injunctive relief to halt illegal gambling activities, such relief is available to
the Attorney General to enforce the closure orders of the Chairman of
NIGC.70 In closing, the court found that because the State prohibited
gambling, it was under no duty to negotiate with the Tribe for a gambling
compact.7
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at *3. The court determined that because the Tribe failed to complain about the
Attorney General's appearance, it was somehow barred from pursuing this argument. Id. This
seems a nefarious statement in view of the fact that the Tribe did not name the United States as
a defendant.
64. Id.
65. 362 U.S. 482, 492 (1960).
66. United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe, 1998 WL 30158, at *3.
67. Id.
68. Id. at *6.
69. Id. (citing Spire v. Strawberries, Inc., 473 N.W.2d 428, 435 (Neb. 1991)).
70. Id.
71. Id.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
INDIAN HEALTH CARE IMPROVEMENT ACT: What Constitutes a "State"
United States v. Bering Strait School District, No. 96-35827, 1998 WL
106108 (9th Cir. 1997)
The United States brought action for reimbursement for the reasonable
expenses incurred by both the United States and Norton Sound Health
Corporation. Under the Indian Health Care Improvement Act (the Act), a
nongovernmental health insurer is required to reimburse the United States for
health care provided by the United States to Indians and Alaskan Natives who
were covered by a health insurance plan." Only an entity qualifying as a
"state" under the Act is exempt.74 At issue is whether the Bering Strait School
District (the District) qualifies as a "state."'75
The court distinguished between entities that are agencies of the State and
thus exempt under the Act and entities which are merely arms of the state and
thus, not exempt. The court stated that "a local government unit, though
established under state law, funded by the state, and ultimately under state
control, with jurisdiction over only a limited area, is not a 'State."' 76 Using
this description, the court held that the District is not a "state" and is not
entitled to the exemption under the Act.'
SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS
SOVEREIGNTY: Recognition of Sovereign Powers
State v. Wakole, No. 77330, 1998 WL 272713 (Kan. May 29, 1998)
In 1996, Priscila Wakole was driving a van bearing Sac and Fox tribal
plates on a Kansas highway.' She was stopped, arrested, and convicted" of
driving an illegally registered vehicle, a misdemeanor.
Wakole appealed the conviction to the Court of Appeals of Kansas, which
overturned the conviction."' In its decision, the court held that the Kansas
72. 25 U.S.C. § 1621e (1994).
73. United States v. Bering Strait Sch. Dist., No. 96-35827, 1998 WL 106108, at *1 (9th Cir.
1997).
74. Id.
75. Id. at *2.
76. Id. at *3.
77. Id.
78. State v. Wakole, No. 77330, 1998 WL 272713, at *2 (Kan. May 29, 1998).
79. Id.
80. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-142 (1995).
81. Wakole, 1998 WL 272713, at *7.
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statute' defining "state" included Indian nations.' It was on this holding
that the court reversed the conviction.' The state petitioned for review.'
The Supreme Court of Kansas held that the Sac and Fox tribal plate was
legal in the State of Kansas because the plates are recognized under
Oklahoma law.' However, the Supreme Court of Kansas specifically
disapproved of the opinion of the Court of Appeals recognizing the
sovereignty of a tribe.' Instead, the Supreme Court of Kansas relied on
Oklahoma recognition of the plates for its decision.'
The message from Kansas and its supreme court is clear. Native
Americans traveling in Kansas with tribal plates on their vehicles make
themselves a target for law enforcement. In addition, the state clearly showed
its feelings toward Native Americans by petitioning for review of a conviction
that was ludicrous from the beginning. Finally, in its decision, the Supreme
Court of Kansas made it clear that the sovereignty of tribes is not recognized
in Kansas. In this case, the Sac and Fox tribe was not considered to be a
sovereign nation but rather, in the words of Priscila Wakole, "a subentity of
the State of Oklahoma, a mere subdivision . . . ."" From the initial arrest,
through the conviction and the ultimate reversal by the Supreme Court of
Kansas, it is quite clear that Native Americans are not welcome in the Great
State of Kansas.
82. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-138a.
83. Wakole, 1998 WL 272713, at *2.
84. Id. at *7.
85. Id. at * 1.
86. Id. at *5.
87. Id. at *6.
88. Id.
89. Id. at *2.
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